Abstract. In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization criterion we consider the exponential certainty equivalent. The discounted reward case on a finite and an infinite time horizon is considered, as well as the ergodic reward case. Under continuity and compactness conditions we prove that the value of the game exists and solves the Shapley equation and we show the existence of optimal (non-stationary) strategies. In the ergodic reward case we work with a local minorization property and a Lyapunov condition and show that the value of the game solves the Poisson equation. Moreover, we prove the existence of optimal stationary strategies. A simple example highlights the influence of the risk-sensitivity parameter. Our results generalize findings in [1] and answer an open question posed there.
Introduction
In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with finite or infinite time horizon. The discounted reward case as well as the ergodic reward case are considered. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization criterion we consider the exponential certainty equivalent which for a random variable X and a risk sensitivity parameter γ = 0 is defined by ρ(X) = 1 γ ln E e γX .
For small γ a Taylor series expansion reveals that ρ(X) = E X + 1 2 γV ar(X) + O(γ 2 ) and that γ → 0 corresponds to the risk-neutral case. Hence the exponential certainty equivalent constitutes a risk-adjusted expectation similar to the classical mean-variance criterion. For deeper economical insight, we refer the reader to [7] . In case γ > 0, the variance is added and the first player is risk-seeking whereas for γ < 0 the variance is subtracted and the first player is risk-averse. In the context of a zero-sum game with γ < 0 where the first player wants to maximize the exponential certainty equivalent and the second player wants to minimize the exponential certainty equivalent, the second player is often interpreted as the nature which works against the first player. Thus the game can be seen as a kind of worst-case optimization. Risksensitive optimization problems have been considered since the seminal paper [23] , but it was only lately that this topic gained renewed interest. This is mainly due to applications in finance.
Whereas there are a lot of papers on risk-sensitive Markov Decision processes under different optimization criteria (see e.g. [23, 32, 24, 21, 14, 8, 10, 15, 25, 11, 4, 31, 5, 6] ), there are only a few papers on risk-sensitive stochastic games in discrete time. In [27] the author considers Nash equilibria for a two-person non-zero-sum game with a quadratic-exponential cost criterion and in [26] the authors treat so-called overlapping generations models. In [1] the authors consider twoperson zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic games with countable state space under the discounted cost criterion and the ergodic cost criterion. In their model the authors replace the one-stage cost c 0000 (copyright holder) in the exponential by the average over the randomized policies and later make the simplifying assumption that the one-stage cost does not depend on the actions of the two players. The average cost problem is solved with a standard uniform ergodicity condition. There are more papers on risk-sensitive stochastic differential games, i.e. games in continuous time (see e.g. [16, 18, 2, 13] ). But the solution techniques via Backward Stochastic Differential Equations and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations are quite different.
In this paper we extend the results of [1] . Throughout we work with Borel state and action spaces and general one-stage rewards which may depend on actions of both players. The onestage rewards are assumed to be bounded. Since we use randomized actions, we interpret expectations w.r.t. the evolution of the state process and the randomization over actions. First we consider the finite horizon stochastic game, then the infinite horizon discounted game. We show that the value of the game exists and satisfies the Shapley equation. Moreover, we prove the existence of optimal strategies for both players which has been posed as an open problem in [1] . In order to be able to apply the usual minimax theorem for the existence of saddle points, we need convexity of the expression in the Shapley equation w.r.t. to the randomization measures for the actions of player 1 and 2. This is achieved by applying a trick which has been used in [24] before: We consider a modified transition measure which is not necessarily a probability measure any more and contains part of the reward. The same approach also works for the infinite horizon with discount factor β < 1. We again obtain the Shapley equation for the value of the game and show the existence of optimal strategies -a statement which has been posed as an open question in [1] (Remark 1). We treat both the risk-seeking (γ > 0) and the risk-averse case (γ < 0). In the ergodic reward case we assume β = 1 and use a local minorization property together with a Lyapunov condition in order to obtain ergodicity (see [19, 31] ). For γ = 0, i.e. in the risk-neutral situation, our condition reduces to the one in [19] for the ergodicity of Markov chains. Here we show for small γ that the value of the game does not depend on the initial state and is a partial solution of the Poisson equation. Moreover, there exist optimal stationary strategies for both players.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the next section we introduce our model and formulate the problem for a finite time horizon. Moreover, we introduce some continuity and compactness conditions which we use throughout our paper for the existence of optimal strategies. In section 3 we first consider the problem with a finite time horizon and prove the Shapley equation for the value of the game and the existence of optimal (non-stationary) strategies. In this section we also present a simple example which highlights the influence of the risk sensitivity parameter γ on the optimal strategies for the players. In Section 4 we consider the infinite horizon discounted reward game. Under the same condition as in Section 3 we show a Shapley equation for the optimal value of the game and prove the existence of optimal stationary strategies. Finally in Section 5 we solve the ergodic risk-sensitive game under local ergodicity conditions.
Model Formulation
We suppose that the following two-person zero-sum stochastic game is given: The state space is a Borel set E, the action spaces for player 1 and 2 are denoted by A and B respectively and are Borel spaces too. It is assumed that E × A contains the graph of a measurable map from E into A and that E × B contains the graph of a measurable map from E into B. For any x ∈ E, the non-empty and measurable x-section A x of A denotes the set of all admissible actions for player 1, if the system is in state x. The analogous assumptions and notations are used for player 2. We suppose that there is a transition kernel Q from E × A × B to E and a measurable reward function r : E × A × B → R for player 1 which is bounded and without loss of generality 0 ≤ r ≤r.
The game is played as follows: At each stage both players observe the current state x ∈ E and choose actions a ∈ A x and b ∈ B x independently of each other. Player 1 then receives the reward r(x, a, b). Afterwards the system moves to a new state according to the transition kernel Q (·|x, a, b) . The reward may be discounted by a factor β ∈ (0, 1]. The aim of the first player is to maximize the risk-sensitive accumulated reward of the stochastic game over a finite or an infinite time horizon and the aim of the second player is to minimize it. Before we introduce the objectives, let us first define the policies. Since even for ordinary risk-neutral games it is known that optimal policies can only be found in the class of randomized policies, we have to consider this class too. Let us denote by P(A) the set of all probability measures on A, endowed with the weak topology. Then {(x, µ, ν) : x ∈ E, µ ∈ P(A x ), ν ∈ P(B x )} is a measurable subset of E × P(A) × P(B). We will denote by F the set of all measurable mappings f : E → P(A) such that f (x) ∈ P(A x ) for all x ∈ E. The decision rule f is interpreted as a randomized decision rule for player 1. A randomized Markovian policy is then a sequence of decision rules (f n ) with f n ∈ F. Similarly for player 2, we denote the set of all randomized decision rules by G and elements by g ∈ G. In this paper we do not consider non-Markovian policies, since as for the risk-neutral game, it can be shown that the value functions remain unchanged if the set of admissible policies is enlarged to the class of history-dependent policies. This has first been shown for risk-neutral Markov Decision Processes in Theorem 18.4 of [22] . For general certainty equivalents the question has been considered in [4] . Though in general optimal policies are history dependent, the statement holds for the exponential certainty equivalent. The proof given in [4] directly generalizes to the game setting. A randomized stationary policy is a Markovian policy (f n ) where f n = f independent of n.
Two randomized policies π = (f n ) and σ = (g n ) together with the initial state x define according to the Theorem of Ionescu Tulcea a probability measure P πσ
The reward generated by the policies over N stages is
The risk-sensitive reward (exponential certainty equivalent) for player 1 under the policies π and σ is then given by 1
where E πσ x is the expectation under P πσ x and (A 0 , B 0 , X 1 , . . .) is the process under π and σ. We first assume that the risk-sensitivity parameter γ ∈ (0,γ]. Since γ is positive and the logarithm is monotone we can equivalently consider the optimization criterion
The term zero-sum game refers to the fact that the total utility of player 1 is exp γR N and we assume that the total utility of player 2 is − exp γR N . The corresponding upper value of the game over N stages is given by
, the function V N is called value function of the stochastic game. A policy π * is called optimal for player 1 for the N -stage game if
A policy σ * is called optimal for player 2 for the N -stage game if
A pair of policies (π * , σ * ) for which
is called saddle-point equilibrium and implies that π * is optimal for player 1, σ * is optimal for player 2 and that V N π * σ * = V N . In order to ease notation we will in general call (π * , σ * ) a saddle-point of a function v(π, σ) if
Throughout we make the following assumptions (see e.g. [3] ):
(A1) The sets A x and B x are compact for every x ∈ E.
(A2) The correspondences x → A x and x → B x are continuous. We call a correspondence x → A x continuous if it is upper-semicontinuous, meaning that {x ∈ E : A x ∩ C = ∅} is closed in E for every closed subset C ⊂ A, and lower-semicontinuous if {x ∈ E :
The transition measure Q is weakly continuous, i.e. for all bounded and continuous
Note that the assumptions are of course satisfied when E is countable and A x and B x are finite.
Finite Horizon Discounted Game
We solve the problem by transforming it to the classical risk-neutral setup with a different transition measure. Such a transformation has also been used in the context of risk-sensitive partially observable models (see [24] ). Recall that we first restrict to the case γ > 0. Let us define a transition measureQ from
It follows directly from this definition thatQ is also weakly continuous in (x, γ, a, b). Moreover, define for µ ∈ P(A x ) and for ν ∈ P(B x )
For f ∈ F, g ∈ G, µ ∈ P(A x ), ν ∈ P(B x ) and a bounded, measurable function v : E×(0,γ] → R let us introduce the following operators:
In what follows we always set V 0 (x, γ) = 1. The value of the game for fixed policies can be computed with the help of the T f g -operator.
Theorem 3.1. Let π = (f 0 , f 1 , . . .) and σ = (g 0 , g 1 , . . .) be randomized policies for player 1 and 2 respectively. Then it holds for all n = 1, . . . , N that
. .) are the shifted policies.
Proof. It suffices to prove part a), since part b) follows directly from a) and the definition of the operators. Part a) is done by induction. For n = 1 we obtain
Now suppose the statement is true for n − 1. We obtain
and the induction hypothesis implies the statement.
The next theorem provides the solution of the problem. Let us denote by C the set of continuous and bounded functions on E × (0,γ].
Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1)-(A4).
a) For all n = 1, . . . , N it holds that V n ∈ C and
. Then V N is the value of the N -stage stochastic game and
n ) are optimal policies for player 1 and 2 respectively.
Proof. First we define for all admissible (µ, ν) : E × (0,γ] → P(A) × P(B) and functions v ∈ C the operator (T µν v)(x, γ) := (Lv) x, γ, µ(x, γ), ν(x, γ) . Also note that for v ∈ C it holds that there exists a (measurable) saddle point (µ * , ν * ) such that
This follows from a classical measurable selection theorem in [9] and a minimax theorem (Theorem 2) in [17] , see e.g. [29] .
By induction on n we show that
For n = 1 we obtain by definition of V 1 and Theorem 3.1 that
The remaining statements (ii)-(iv) follow directly from the definition of µ * 1 , ν * 1 and V 1 . Now suppose the statement is true for n − 1. Obviously the T µν -operator is monotone, i.e. for v, w ∈ C with v ≤ w we obtain T µν v ≤ T µν w. Since V n−1 ∈ C, the selection theorem and the minimax theorem imply the existence of a saddle point (µ * n , ν * n ) on stage n. With the induction hypothesis we obtain
for any µ 1 , . . . , µ n . On the other hand
. . , ν n . Moreover since we can identify a sequence (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) with a policy π = (f 0 , . . . , f n−1 ) by setting f k (x) := µ n−k (x, γβ k ) for k = 0, . . . , n − 1 and similarly for π * , σ, σ * , we have shown that there exist policies π * and σ * for the n-stage game such that for any arbitrary policies π, σ V nπσ * ≤ V nπ * σ * ≤ V nπ * σ . But this means that (π * , σ * ) is a saddle-point and
V 0 is the value of the game and π * and σ * are optimal for player 1 and 2 respectively.
Combining above results, the statement follows. 
Remark 3.5. We have stated our results in the framework of γ > 0, but the same arguments and statements also hold true in case γ < 0. One only has to consider the state space E × [γ, 0). Figure 1 shows the optimal (randomized) strategies as functions of γ. The case γ = 0 corresponds to the risk-neutral game with optimal strategies y * = 0.5 and z * = 0.75. As we can see from Figure 1 , but can also be shown analytically, is that y(γ) → 1, z(γ) → 1 for γ → ∞, i.e. in this case the players asymptotically use pure strategies and agree on the best value for player 1. For γ → −∞ we obtain y(γ) → 0, z(γ) → 1, i.e. again both players use asymptotically pure strategies and this time agree on the worst value for player 1. Intuitively this behavior is clear, since the randomization of the strategies is the only stochastic component in this model and whereas it is optimal to use randomized strategies in the risk-neutral case (γ = 0) players tend to reduce their own produced variability if |γ| → ∞. For the special model with countable state space in [1] , the authors have shown in Section 5 that this observation is also true for the risk-sensitive average reward case. The behavior of the optimal strategies in the discounted reward case is still open.
Infinite Horizon Discounted Game
In this section we consider the game with an infinite time horizon and β ∈ (0, 1). The risk-sensitive reward for player 1 under the policies π and σ is here given by
The corresponding upper value of the game is
If inf σ sup π V ∞πσ (x, γ) = sup π inf σ V ∞πσ (x, γ), the function V ∞ is called value function of the stochastic game with infinite time horizon. A policy π * is called optimal for player 1 in this case if
A policy σ * is called optimal for player 2 if
The policy pair (π * , σ * ) for which
is called saddle-point equilibrium and implies that π * is optimal for player 1 and σ * is optimal for player 2.
4.1. Positive risk-sensitivity γ > 0. Here we assume that γ ∈ (0,γ] and denote the upper bound of r byr. The next theorem provides the solution of the infinite horizon problem. Recall that C is the set of all continuous and bounded functions on E × (0,γ].
Theorem 4.1. Assume (A1)-(A4) and let γ ∈ (0,γ].
a) It holds that V ∞ is the unique solution v ∈ C of the Shapley equation
b) There exist measurable functions (µ * , ν * ) : E×(0,γ] → P(A)×P(B) with µ * (x, γ) ∈ P(A x ) and ν * (x, γ) ∈ P(B x ) such that (µ * (x, γ), ν * (x, γ)) is a saddle point of
. Then V ∞ is the value of the infinite horizon stochastic game and (π * , σ * ) = (f * n , g * n ) n=0,...,N −1 with f * n (x) := µ * (x, γβ n ) and g * n (x) := ν * (x, γβ n ) are optimal policies for player 1 and 2 respectively.
Proof.
a) Obviously the values V n = T n V 0 of the n-stage games are increasing and bounded and hence a limit V := lim n→∞ V n exists. We first prove that V ∞ = V . By monotonicity we see directly that V n ≤ V ∞ which implies that V ≤ V ∞ . On the other hand we have for arbitrary policies π and σ that V ∞πσ (x, γ) ≤ V nπσ (x, γ) · δ n with δ n := exp γβ nr 1−β and lim n→∞ δ n = 1. Thus we obtain
which yields V ∞ ≤ V and thus equality. Note that the convergence lim n→∞ V n = V ∞ is uniform because of
The right hand side converges to 0 for n → ∞ and does not depend on x and γ any more. Uniform convergence implies that V ∞ ∈ C again. Next we show that V ∞ = T V ∞ . Since V n ≤ V ∞ we obtain by applying the T -operator to this inequality that V n+1 = T V n ≤ T V ∞ and by letting n → ∞ that V ∞ = V ≤ T V ∞ . On the other hand we have V ∞ ≤ V n · δ n and again by applying the T -operator to this inequality we obtain T V ∞ ≤ T (V n · δ n ) = δ n · T V n = δ n · V n+1 . Thus by letting n → ∞ we obtain T V ∞ ≤ V ∞ and hence V ∞ = T V ∞ .
Finally we show the uniqueness of the solution of the Shapley equation in the set of continuous functions with lower bound b := 1 and upper boundb(γ) := e γr 1−β . The first step is to see that T b ≥ b becauseQ is not necessarily a probability measure but has a total mass larger or equal to 1. On the other hand we have
Since the T -operator is monotone we have that T n b ↑ and T nb ↓ for n → ∞. Obviously we obtain
Hence we see that T n b ↑ V ∞ and T nb ↓ V ∞ for n → ∞. Now suppose that there is another solution v ∈ C of v = T v with b ≤ v ≤b. This then implies that T n b ≤ v ≤ T nb for all n which shows uniqueness of the fixed point. b) The existence of a saddle point (µ * , ν * ) follows again from the measurable selection theorem and the minimax theorem. Let T µν v be defined as in Theorem 3.2. By monotonicity and the fact that 1 ≤ V ∞ (x, γ) ≤ e γr 1−β we obtain that lim n→∞ T n µ * ν * V 0 = lim n→∞ T n µ * ν * V ∞ = V ∞π * σ * for π * , σ * defined in the statement. By the definition of the saddle point we obtain for any admissible (µ 1 , ν 1 ) :
As usual the saddle point property implies that sup
Hence we can also write
By iterating this inequality n-times we end up with
. .) with g n (x) = ν n (x, γβ n ). The same is true on the left-hand side. In total we obtain that
for all policies π and σ which yields the statement.
4.2.
Negative risk-sensitivity γ < 0. Here we assume that γ ∈ [γ, 0). The next theorem provides the solution of the infinite horizon problem. Proof. Note that most inequalities simply reverse. In particular we obtain V ∞ (x, γ) ≥ V n (x, γ)·δ n with δ n as in the previous proof.
Ergodic Game
In this section we consider the risk-sensitive average reward with β = 1. Following Remark 3.3 we now skip the dependence on γ in our notations. Hence for two randomized policies π and σ for player 1 and 2 respectively we define
In case we have stationary policies, i.e. π = (f, f, . . .) and σ = (g, g, . . .) we simply write J f g (x).
If inf σ sup π J πσ (x) = sup π inf σ J πσ (x), the function J is called value function of the average reward stochastic game. A policy π * is called optimal for player 1 in this case if
is called saddle-point equilibrium and implies that π * is average optimal for player 1 and σ * is average optimal for player 2.
Here we cannot ignore the logarithm (see Remark (3.4)) and define for f ∈ F, g ∈ G, µ ∈ P(A x ), ν ∈ P(B x ) and a measurable function v : E → R the following operators, given the expectation exists:
Recall the definition ofQ in (3.2). Since γ is fixed here we suppress the dependence on γ.
ObviouslyQ is in general not a probability measure. The normalizing constant is for x ∈ E, µ ∈ P(A x ) and ν ∈ P(B x ) given by
Since 0 ≤ r ≤r, the function c is also bounded. More precisely 1 ≤ c(x, µ, ν) ≤ e γr for all x, µ, ν in case γ > 0 and e γr ≤ c(x, µ, ν) ≤ 1 in case γ < 0. Thuŝ
defines a transition kernel and using the notationr(x, µ, ν) := 1 γ ln c(x, µ, ν) we can rewrite the U -operator as
Note that 0 ≤r ≤r. Due to the dual representation of the exponential certainty equivalent (see e.g. Lemma 3.3 in [20] ) it is possible to write
where the supremum is over all probability measures ψ ∈ P(E) and I(p, q) is the relative entropy of the two probability measures p, q which is defined by I(p, q) := ln dp dq p(dx)
when p q and +∞ otherwise. Note that the maximal probability measure in (5.4) is given by
for measurable sets B ⊂ E, provided the denominator is finite. Obviously ψ v can be interpreted as a transition kernel.
In what follows let w : E → [1, ∞) be a measurable weight function and define for measurable functions v : E → R the weighted supremum norm by
.
By B w we denote the space of all measurable functions v : E → R with finite w-norm. We shall also consider the weighted span (semi) norm
The norms are related as follows (for a proof see [19] , Lemma 2.1):
Lemma 5.1. For all v ∈ B w we have v sp,w = inf c∈R v + c w .
Let W (x) ≥ 0 be measurable and w(x) := 1 + βW (x) for some β > 0 (the discount factor is here equal to 1, so we can use β for a new variable). Obviously the norms · 1+βW are equivalent for all β > 0. Hence B 1+βW is independent of β. Also the span (semi) norms · sp,1+βW are equivalent for all β > 0.
For our main results we use the following ergodicity conditions (E):
There exists a measurable function W : E → [0, ∞) and constants K > 0,ᾱ ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all v ∈ B w and µ ∈ P(A x ), ν ∈ P(B x ) where ψ v is given by (5.5). (E2): There exists a probability measure λ and a constantα ∈ (0, 1) such that
a) Note that for γ = 0 the ergodicity conditions (E) coincide with the ergodicity conditions in [19] . b) Assumption (E2) is a local minorization property which implies ergodicity of the state process together with the geometric ergodicity condition (E1). When W ≡ 0, then E 0 = R and (E2) becomes a global Doeblin condition. c) Note that (E2) is equivalent to
for all x ∈ E 0 and for all a ∈ A x , b ∈ B x .
Let us now define w 0 (x) := 1 + 1 K W (x), x ∈ E. In order that ψ v is well-defined we make the following integrability assumption (F):
(F): There exists a constant K 0 > 0 such that
for all x ∈ E, µ ∈ P(A x ), ν ∈ P(B x ) and
Forγ > 0 (arbitrarily large) and M > 0 define
We show next that condition (E2) also holds for the transition kernels ψ v : Lemma 5.3. Let γ ∈ (−γ 0 , γ 0 ), β ∈ (0, 1 K ) and assume (F). Then condition (E2) implies that there exists a probability measureλ and a constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that
Proof. First note that due to (E2) we have
We consider now the case γ ∈ (0, γ 0 ). The case γ ∈ (−γ 0 , 0) is similar. By definition ofQ we obtain for v ∈ B (M )
where α is defined by
and is thus independent of M and β.
Moreover, we need the following constants (see [19] ): For δ 0 :=ᾱ + 2 K R < 1 and α 0 ∈ (0, α) let
From now on we consider w(x) = 1 + βW (x) with W from (E1) and β := and x 1 , x 2 ∈ E. In order to obtain the right estimate we define the following ε-minimizer or maximizer respectively for an ε > 0:
Then we obtain that
Then we let ε ↓ 0 and proceed with the inequality as follows, where c ∈ R is arbitrary:
Now we go ahead as in [19] and distinguish two cases: Case 1:
Here we obtain
Taking the infimum over all c ∈ R we obtain the first inequality below using Lemma 5.1. The remainder follows from (E1) as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [19] :
with δ 1 := 2+Rβδ 0 2+Rβ < 1. Altogether the claim follows. Case 2:
Here we define for i = 1, 2 using Lemma 5.3:
Hence for a measurable function h : E → R we obtain
Then we get in the same way as in [19] Theorem 3.1:
Recalling the definition of β and setting δ 2 := (1 − (α − α 0 )) ∨ᾱ yields
≤ v 1 − v 2 sp,w · δ 2 2 + βW (x 1 ) + βW (x 2 ) .
Combining above results, the statement follows.
Next we show the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Assume (E) and (F). For all v 1 , v 2 ∈ B w , f ∈ F and g ∈ G it holds: a) lim n→∞ Note that v 1 − v 2 w < ∞ since v 1 , v 2 ∈ B w . The proof is by induction on n. For n = 1 we obtain: v is continuous}. Moreover, we need the assumption (A4'): W is continuous and for all v ∈ C w the function (x, µ, ν) → e v(x )Q (dx |x, µ, ν) is continuous.
Remark 5.6. Note that (A4 ) directly implies (5.6), if E 0 is compact. Now we are able to prove our main result for the ergodic game.
Theorem 5.7. Let γ ∈ (−γ 0 , γ 0 ) and assume (A1)-(A3),(A4'), (E) and (F).
a) The Poisson equation
has a solution (φ * , v * ) ∈ R + × C w where φ * is unique. b) There exist measurable functions (f * , g * ) ∈ F × G such that (f * (x), g * (x)) is a saddle point of (f, g) → (U f g v * )(x), x ∈ E for all (f, g) ∈ F × G. Then φ * is the value of the average risk-sensitive game and the stationary policies (f * , f * , . . .) and (g * , g * , . . .) are average risk-sensitive optimal for player 1 and 2 respectively. In particular, J f * g * (x) = φ * = J(x) for all x ∈ E.
Proof. a) We consider the following sequence of functions: v 0 := 0, v n := U n 0 for n ∈ N. We claim that v n ∈ C (M )
w . The statement is obvious for v 0 . Suppose the statement is (E1) only for functions v ∈ B I w in which case the condition reduces to:
W (x )ψ v (dx |x, µ, ν) = W (x )e γv(x )Q (dx |x, µ, ν) e γv(x )Q (dx |x, µ, ν) ≤ W (x )Q(dx |x, µ, ν).
due to the fact that the random variables W (X) and e γv(X) are negatively correlated which implies 
